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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tony Brown pied guilty to one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon 
after he attacked Jesseray Bell, mistaking him to be Richard Wilson. Mr. Brown was 
looking for Mr. Wilson because he had heard that Mr. Wilson had threatened to kill his 
girlfriend's child. The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with four 
years fixed, on Mr. Brown. 
During the sentencing hearing following his guilty plea to aggravated battery with 
a deadly weapon, Mr. Brown expressed his desire to remain silent at his sentencing 
hearing, as was his state and federal constitutional right. The district court, however, 
compelled him to speak. It then disparaged his statements as though they were newly-
invented falsehoods because there were several other explanations in the record, 
despite evidence demonstrating that Mr. Brown's statement was consistent with his own 
prior explanations. Based in part on those illegally-compelled statements, the district 
court imposed the maximum sentence allowed. It did so despite its stated a-version to 
putting young offenders without significant records (like Mr. Brown) in prison instead of 
sending them to get treatment through community-based or rider programs. By 
compelling Mr. Brown to make these statements against his will at his sentencing 
hearing, the district court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free of 
self-incrimination. As such, this Court should vacate his sentence and remand for new 
sentencing before a new judge. 
Furthermore, the district court did not sufficiently consider several mitigating 
factors present in this case. In doing so, it did not sufficiently consider Idaho's 
1 
recognized sentencing objectives. As a result, it imposed an excessive sentence on 
Mr. Brown in an abuse of its discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
From the outset, Mr. Brown has expressed remorse and accepted responsibility 
for his actions. (Augmentation - Letter to Victim; Augmentation - Letter to State; 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.5; 4/25/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-14, 
p.19, Ls.2-9.) After learning of a threat to the life of his girlfriend's child, Mr. Brown set 
out to find Richard Wilson (the alleged threat-maker) and beat him up in response to the 
threat. 1 (See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17.) Mr. Brown found a person who 
he believed was Mr. Wilson and attacked that person with a baseball bat. (2/28/11 Tr., 
p.13, Ls.5-18.) He was mistaken, however, and had attacked Jesseray Bell instead of 
Mr. Wilson. (2/28/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-18.) As Mr. Bell informed the district court, the 
attack did significant and permanent damage. (4/25/11 Tr., p.8, L.2 - p.9, L.22; 
Augmentation - Evaluations from Elk's Rehab and Hearing and Balance Center 
(hereinafteF, Evaluations).) 
Exemplifying his remorse, Mr. Brown had prepared letters of apology to both 
Mr. Bell and his family, as well as the State, copies of which he presented to the district 
court at his arraignment to be included in the PSI information. (2/28/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-8; 
Augmentation - Letter to Victim; Augmentation - Letter to State.) Through this process, 
1 While other witnesses proffered other motives for their actions (see, e.g., 4/25/11 
Tr., p.25, L.7 - p.26, L.7), Mr. Brown has consistently referred to the threat as his 
explanation of his motives. (2/28/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-16; PSI, p.5; 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, 
Ls.15-17, p.32, Ls.9-10.) There is no evidence in the record that suggests Mr. Brown, 
himself, offered any other explanation. He also had not told the others involved why he 
wanted to beat up Mr. Wilson. (PSI, p.5.) 
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Mr. Brown's family continued to express their support for him. (4/25/11 Tr., p.18, 
Ls.8-11.) This was also his first felony conviction, and his record consisted of only five 
non-violent misdemeanor convictions and one pending non-violent felony charge.2 
(PSI, pp.5-6.) He was fully cooperative with authorities throughout this case. (4/25/11 
Tr., p.18, Ls.1-7; PSI, p.12.) In fact, the district court recognized that his desire to take 
responsibility had caused his felony case to proceed at "lightning speed." (Tr., p.27, 
Ls.10-23.) Mr. Brown pied the factual basis for the charge of aggravated battery with a 
deadly weapon at his arraignment and entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
guilty plea, which the district court accepted. (2/28/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-16.) He made this 
guilty plea without the benefit of a plea bargain.3 ( See 2/28/11 Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.3, L.6.) 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown decided that he had nothing more to 
contribute to the proceedings, and so he decided not to say anything at that time. (See 
4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.2.) However, when he tried to exercise his right to 
silence, the district court compelled him to make a statement: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Brown, anything you want to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: No? I think you really do need to say it. It may be difficult 
to say. 
THE DEFEI\IDANT: I apologize for everything. I really do. 
2 Mr. Brown's record consisted of two minor-in-possession of tobacco convictions, two 
minor-in-possession of alcohol convictions, one driving without privileges conviction, 
and one pending felony delivery and possession of marijuana charge. 
3 Defense counsel indicated that negotiations had taken place, but that they had 
not resulted in an agreement which would bind the prosecutor to a specific set of 
recommendations in exchange for Mr. Brown's guilty plea. (2/28/11 Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.3, 
L.6.) Rather, he intended to plead guilty and allow the prosecutor to evaluate the PSI 
and make a recommendation accordingly. (2/28/11 Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.3, L.6.) 
3 
THE COURT: What led you here, Mr. Brown? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to speak. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to talk about it. 
THE COURT: No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk about it. 
It's part of the responsibility. 
THE DEFENDANT: Richard [Wilson] said he was going to kill my 
girlfriend's kids, so that's how we got there. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17.) The district court then proceeded to attack 
Mr. Brown's explanation as though it were untruthful. ( See 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.18 -
p.26, L.16.) Mr. Brown tried to assert his right to silence again later in the proceedings, 
but the district court again required him to speak by challenging the truthfulness of his 
explanation: 
THE COURT: I'm wanting [sic] to hear what you have to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to say anything else. 
THE COURT: Is it because it's not true? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, it's true. You just don't believe it. 
THE COURT: I'm asking you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it's true. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3.) Again, the district court attacked his explanation, 
implying that it was a fabrication, suggesting that he had not told the same story to the 
presentence investigator. (4/25/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.4-5.) However, the presentence 
investigator had included this explanation under the heading "Defendant's Version" in 
her report. (PSI, p.5.) 
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In attacking Mr. Brown's version of events, the district court pointed out that there 
were other accounts in the record that were not consistent with Mr. Brown's explanation. 
( 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.22 - p.26, L.5.) Each of those other explanations, however, was 
provided by someone other than 1\/lr. Brown, and he had not told his compatriots of his 
actual motives. (PSI, p.5.) The first such inconsistent explanation - that Mr. Wilson 
(the intended victim) had been sleeping with someone's sister (4/25/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-
13) - was provided to police by Wendy Payne (1/5/11 Knittel Report, p.2),4 Jon Asher 
(1/5/11 Knittel Report, p.5), and Kana Johnson (1/6/11 McGann Report, p.2). The 
second such inconsistent explanation - that there was an issue involving drugs between 
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Brown (4/25/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-17) -was provided to officers by the 
actual victim, Mr. Bell. (12/26/10 Babcock Report, p.1.) The third such inconsistent 
explanation - that Mr. Wilson had reported Mr. Brown and his friends to police regarding 
a previous battery (4/25/11 Tr., p.25, L.19 - p.26, L.2) - was provided to police by 
Matthew Hardwick (12/29/10 Knittel Report, p.3), and Ms. Payne (12/29/10 Knittel 
Report, p.4; 1/6/11 Knittel Report, p.1 ). Despite the district court's continued assertions 
that he was being untruthful, Mr. Brown stood by his explanation, observing that the 
district court was simply unwilling to believe him. (See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.6-7, 
p.28, Ls.18-19, p.31, L.25- p.32, L.1.) 
Eventually, the district court turned to imposing a sentence, but not before it 
explained that it preferred not to send youthful offenders who did not have significant 
records to prison since community-based programs and the rider programs were more 
effective in rehabilitating such offenders. (Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21.) It also recognized that 
4 There are several, individually-paginated police reports attached to the PSI. They are 
identified by reference to the reporting officer and the date the report was prepared. 
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Mr. Brown was such a youthful offender.5 (4/25/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.14-15, p.42, L.22 -
p.43, L.3.) However, the district court proceeded to tell Mr. Brown that "sometimes 
people do things in life that there's no alternative but the penitentiary because of the 
nature of the crime .... So this is not a case, despite your lack of prior significant 
record, that I could even consider probation or retained jurisdiction."6 (4/25/11 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.22-24, p.38, Ls.14-16.) It then proceeded to impose the maximum sentence of 
fifteen years, four of which were fixed. (4/25/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.9-15; R., pp.58-59.) 
Mr. Brown timely appealed from that order. (R., p.60.) He also, subsequently, filed a 
motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). 
(Augmentation - Rule 35 Motion.) The State moved to dismiss the motion since 
Mr. Brown had not presented any new evidence in support of his motion. 
(Augmentation - Motion to Dismiss ICR 35 Motion.) The district court noted that neither 
Mr. Brown nor the State presented new evidence for it to consider, and so it denied the 
motion.7 (Augmentation - Rule 35 Order, pp.3, 6.) 
5 Mr. Brown was twenty-one years old at the time he was sentenced. (PSI, p.1.) 
6 In the omitted portion of this quote, the district court took a moment to discuss 
Mr. Brown's nature, as well as the nature of his offense. (Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.13.) 
7 The order denying the Rule 35 motion is not challenged on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Brown's state and federal constitutional 
rights to be free from self-incrimination by compelling him to make a statement 
during the sentencing hearing. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Brown following his plea 




The District Court Violated Mr. Brown's State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be 
Free From Self-Incrimination By Compelling Him To Make A Statement During The 
Sentencing Hearing 
A. Introduction 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown decided that he did not wish to add 
anything to the statements made by his attorney. He told the district court several times 
that he did not wish to speak. The district court, however, decided that Mr. Brown 
should speak. As such, it told him that he needed to speak, and in so doing, compelled 
him to make several statements. This violated IVlr. Brown's state and federal 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Therefore, this Court should vacate 
Mr. Brown's sentence and remand this case for new sentencing before a new judge. 
B. The District Court Compelled Mr. Brown To Make Statements In Violation Of His 
State And Federal Constitutional Rights 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No 
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is incorporated against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981 ). The Idaho 
Constitution affords the same protection as the Fifth Amendment. IDAHO CONST. 
Art. I § 13. That right has also been codified by the Idaho Legislature. I.C. § 19-3003. 
Accordingly, due to both state and federal protections, the State cannot force a 
defendant to speak when it seeks to convict or punish him.8 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462; 
8 The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the courts are state actors, and as 
such, when the State bears an obligation to enforce a defendant's rights (such as the 
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State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 218 (1994). These rights are applicable during both the 
trial and sentencing phases of a prosecution. Id. And as to the sentencing phase, 
"[a]ny effort by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his will at the 
sentencing hearing clearly would violate the Fifth Amendment." Este//e, 451 U.S. at 
463; see also State v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 765, 770 n.2 (Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing 
this rule from Estelle would be controlling, had Mr. Anderson invoked his Fifth 
Amendment rights at trial or on appeal). The district court did exactly that in this case, 
compelling Mr. Brown to speak against his will at his sentencing hearing. (4/25/11 
Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17; p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3.) Therefore, this Court should provide 
Mr. Brown with a remedy for that violation of his rights. 
The constitutional protections against self-incrimination apply in both capital and 
non-capital cases, extending to essentially any situation where the defendant has not 
yet been sentenced and has a legitimate fear of adverse consequences resulting from 
further statements. Mitchell v. U.S., 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999); Anderson, 130 Idaho at 
769-70 (citing I.C. § 19-3003). They also apply both in future prosecutions as well as 
the same proceeding in which the testimony is compelled in violation of the rights. 
Anderson, 130 Idaho at 770; I.C. § 19-3003. Furthermore, they apply in both guilty plea 
and guilty verdict cases. Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218. They even apply if the resulting 
sentence is within the discretionary range set forth by statute if the harsher sentence is 
based on the compelled statements. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564 (2006). 
Therefore, they apply to Mr. Brown's compelled statements, made during a guilty plea 
case in the sentencing hearing where the statement was compelled, as he had not yet 
right to a speedy trial), the courts are included within the term "the State." State v. Folk, 
151 Idaho 327, 334 (2011 ). 
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been sentenced and had a legitimate fear of adverse consequences of speaking, and 
the harsher sentence was based, in part, on the compelled statements. 
1. The District Court Compelled Mr. Brown To Speak Against His Will 
The first issue, then, is whether or not the statement was compelled by the 
district court. Specifically in guilty plea cases, there is a limited waiver of the right 
against self-incrimination. The district court is permitted to compel statements from 
the defendant regarding his actions insofar as it is necessary to ensure that the plea is 
valid (i.e., that it was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that there was 
a factual basis for it). Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322-25; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18; 
State v. Heffern, 130 Idaho 946, 949 (Ct. App. 1997). This limited waiver, however, is 
not to be used as "a prosecutorial sword." Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322. Thus, it allows the 
district court to compel statements regarding only the facts of the offense to which the 
defendant pied guilty.9 Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217. Therefore, if the district court 
requires the defendant to give testimony beyond what is needed to ensure the plea is 
valid, then it has compelled the protected statements. See id. 
The district court engaged in the plea colloquy with Mr. Brown at his 
arraignment. 10 (2/28/10 Tr., pp.3-14.) During that colloquy, Mr. Brown admitted, after 
9 In this case, Mr. Brown pied guilty to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-907. (R., p.58.) Therefore, the limited waiver extended only to 
whether Mr. Brown unlawfully and intentionally caused bodily harm to an individual and 
did so with a deadly weapon. See I.C. § 18-903 (defining battery), § 18-907 (defining 
aggravated battery as the commission of battery by certain means or with certain 
results). 
10 During the plea colloquy, the district court did not mention Mr. Brown's right to remain 
silent, were he to proceed, nor the effect pleading guilty would have on that right (i.e., 
the limited waiver). Compare Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 323. The right and the fact that it 
would be waived upon entering a plea of guilty were mentioned in the Statement of 
10 
lengthy clarification, that he intentionally and unlawfully caused bodily harm to Mr. Bell 
(believing him to be Mr. Wilson) and did so with a deadly weapon, specifically, a 
baseball bat. (2/28/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-18.) In so doing, he established a factual basis for 
the plea. See I.C. §§ 18-903, 907. As a result of the colloquy, the district court 
also concluded that Mr. Brown had offered his guilty plea "freely, voluntarily, [and] 
knowingly," and accepted that plea as valid. (2/28/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-16.) At that point, 
Mr. Brown's limited waiver ended, and he was free to rely on the rights against self-
incrimination at his subsequent sentencing hearing. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324; 
Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18; Heffern, 130 Idaho at 949. 
Mr. Brown did, in fact, attempt to rely on those rights at his sentencing, but the 
district court compelled him to make statements at that time: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Brown, anything you want to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: No? I think you really do need to say it. It may be difficult 
to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I apologize for everything. I really do. 
THE COURT: What led you here, Mr. Brown? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to speak. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to talk about it. 
THE COURT: No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk about it. 
It's part of the responsibility. 
THE DEFENDANT: Richard [Wilson] said he was going to kill my 
girlfriend's kids, so that's how we got there. 
Rights which was provided to Mr. Brown. (R., p.17.) That form, however, did not 
explain that the waiver was limited. (See R., p.17.) 
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THE COURT: I'm wanting [sic] to hear what you have to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to say anything else. 
THE COURT: Is it because it's not true? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, it's true. You just don't believe it. 
THE COURT: I'm asking you. 
THE DEFEI\JDANT: Yes, it's true. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17, p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3 (emphasis added).) These 
two sections of dialogue reveal that Mr. Brown invoked his rights against self-
incrimination four different times during his sentencing hearing. (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.2, 
8, 10-11; p.31, Ls.22-23.) The district court, however, told him that he needed to speak. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.3-4, 12-14.) The fact that the district court told Mr. Brown that it 
was necessary that he speak is clear evidence of its coercion and violation of his 
invoked right to remain silent at that time. 
This alone violates the rule set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Estelle: "Any effort by the State to compel respondent to testify against his will at the 
sentencing hearing clearly would violate the Fifth Amendment." Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463 
(emphasis added) (recognizing that the effort by the state actor constitutes the violation; 
whether or not it successfully compels the statements is irrelevant). Since Mr. Brown 
invoked his right to remain silent and the district court, a state actor, put forth an effort 
to compel him to speak, there has been a violation of these rights pursuant to the 
Estelle rule. See Anderson, 130 Idaho at 770 n.2. As such, this violation alone should 
compel this Court to vacate Mr. Brown's sentence and remand for new sentencing 
before a new judge. See id. at 771; Heffern, 130 Idaho at 946. 
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2. Mr. Brown Had A Legitimate Fear That Adverse Consequences Would Result If 
He Made Further Statements 
The second issue regarding when these constitutional rights apply is whether 
Mr. Brown had a legitimate fear that adverse consequences would result from further 
statements. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 326; Anderson, 130 Idaho at 769-70. Mr. Brown 
was concerned that if he made statements at his sentencing hearing, the district court 
would not believe his explanation for his actions. ( See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.28, Ls.18-19; 
p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.1.) As such, there was a clear inference that he feared his 
statements would cause the district court to be more harsh in imposing sentence 
because he was not being honest with it, or that he was trying to avoid accepting 
responsibility. 11 His fear was legitimate and was, in fact, actualized by the district court. 
(See 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.12-14 ("No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk 
about it. It's part of the responsibility.").) 
Another example of the legitimacy of Mr. Brown's fear was that after he made 
one of his compelled explanations - that the person Mr. Brown thought he was 
attacking (Mr. Wilson) had threatened to kill his girlfriend's child the district court 
asked, "Why didn't you say this to the presentence investigator?"12 (4/25/11 Tr., p.32, 
11 Mr. Brown did take responsibility for his actions. For example, he wrote letters of 
apology to Mr. Bell and his family, as well as the State, for his actions, which, notably, 
were presented to the district court for inclusion with the PSI information at his 
arraignment. (2/28/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-8.) Trial counsel also represented to the district 
court that Mr. Brown gave a full confession to officers, which demonstrated his desire to 
take responsibility. (4/25/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-6.) The district court praised Mr. Brown's 
desire to accept responsibility by coming forward and cooperating, so that his case had 
proceeded "at lightning speed." (Tr., p.27, Ls.10-23.) 
12 Mr. Brown consistently maintained that this was the reason he acted as he did. 
(2/28/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-16; PSI, p.5; 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-17, p.32, Ls.9-10.) The 
district court simply referred to the fact that there were several other explanations 
articulated to police during the investigation ( 4/25/11 Tr., p.25, L. 7 - p.26, L. 7), although 
it failed to recognize that these other explanations were only provided by other 
witnesses. There is no evidence in the record to suggest Mr. Brown, himself, ever 
13 
Ls.4-5.) Contrary to the district court's question, Mr. Brown had, in fact, given that 
explanation of his motives to the presentence investigator, who included it in the PS I 
under the heading "Defendant's Version."13 (PSI, p.5.) The district court continued to 
disparage Mr. Brown's explanation of his motives. (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.21 - p.26, L.16, 
p.28, Ls.20-22, p.30, Ls.19-22, p.31, L.8 - p.33, L.7.) Then, in the midst of its criticisms, 
the district court mentioned that: 
I struggle to put young people -- the issue of putting young people in the 
penitentiary, I struggle, because it can be such a hopeless environment. 
And there are so many -- you know, there are other programs in the 
community, or at least though retained jurisdiction to help people get 
squared away ... especially for someone with no significant history. 
( 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21.) The district court also recognized that Mr. Brown was 
one such offender. 14 (4/25/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.14-15, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.3.) Despite that 
assertion, the district court proceeded to impose the maximum total sentence 
permissible - fifteen years, four years of which it imposed as fixed time. (4/25/11 
Tr., p.40, Ls.9-12.) This demonstrates a significant departure from the district court's 
expressed approach to offenders like Mr. Brown. ( See 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21.) In 
so doing, the district court proved that Mr. Brown's fear was not only legitimate, but that 
it was correct. Therefore, the district court's actions violated Mr. Brown's constitutional 
rights to be free from self-incrimination. 
offered any other explanation for his actions. Furthermore, Mr. Brown had not told his 
compatriots his actual motivations. (PSI, p.5.) As such, the fact that everyone else had 
differing speculations as to those motives is not surprising, nor does it discredit 
Mr. Brown's explanation. 
13 The district court made the clearly erroneous assertion that Mr. Brown had not 
informed the presentence investigator of that explanation of his motives on two different 
occasions during the sentencing hearing. (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-19, p.32, Ls.4-5.) 
14 Mr. Brown does not have a significant history. Rather, he only has five misdemeanor 
convictions for minor in possession of alcohol and tobacco and driving without 
privileges. (PSI, p.5-6.) Otherwise, he only had one pending felony delivery and 
possession of marijuana charge. (PSI, p.6.) 
14 
Moreover, the district court stated that the aspect of this case that had it 
concerned was the long-term consequences to Mr. Bell as a result of the fact that 
Mr. Brown "had, [sic] some bone to pick with somebody else." (Tr., p.36, L.1 - p.37, 
L.2.) This demonstrates that the compelled statements regarding Mr. Brown's motives 
were the basis, at least in part, for the harsher penalty, when considered in light of the 
district court's stated inclination against incarcerating offenders like Mr. Brown. 
Therefore, as the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, this sentence, based in part on 
compelled statements, violated Mr. Brown's right against self-incrimination, despite the 
fact that the imposed sentence was within the statutory maximum. See Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 564. 
The district court violated Mr. Brown's state and federal constitutional rights to be 
free from self-incrimination by compelling him to speak at his sentencing hearing 
against his will. He had validly invoked his right to remain silent, as he had a legitimate 
fear that speaking could have adverse consequences and his limited waiver of these 
rights had expired. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322-26; see a/so; Anderson, 130 Idaho at 
769-70 (discussing the validity of the invocation when there is a legitimate fear of 
adverse consequences); Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18 (discussing the validity of the 
invocation in light of the limited waiver). Therefore, because of this violation of his 
constitutional rights, this Court should vacate Mr. Brown's sentence and remand this 
case for new sentencing before a new judge. See Anderson, 130 Idaho at 771; Heffern, 
130 Idaho at 946. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years, With Four Years Fixed. Upon Mr. Brown Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Aggravated Battery With A Deadly Weapon 
A. Introduction 
Should this Court determine that Mr. Brown's constitutional rights were not 
violated by the district court, it should still afford him relief because the district court 
nevertheless abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence. First, it 
inappropriately limited its sentencing discretion. Second, it insufficiently considered 
several mitigating factors which were present. Those factors included Mr. Brown's 
sincere expressions of remorse, his acceptance of responsibility, his full cooperation 
with authorities, his lack of a prior record, and his continuing support from family and 
others. As a result, the district court did not sufficiently consider Idaho's recognized 
sentencing objectives, and so imposed the excessive sentence in an abuse of 
discretion. This Court should remedy these abuses of discretion. 
B. The District Court lmperrriissibly Restricted Its Sentencing Discretion By Finding 
That, Based Upon The Nature Of The Crime. It Could Not Consider Probation Or 
Retained Jurisdiction 
The first factor evidencing an abuse of discretion is the district court's self-
imposed restriction upon its sentencing discretion. Immediately after noting that it 
considered community-based programs or rider programs to be more effective at 
rehabilitating young offenders who did not have significant records (of whom Mr. Brown 
is one), the district court informed Mr. Brown that "sometimes people do things in life 
that there's no alternative but the penitentiary because of the nature of the crime .... So 
this is not a case, despite your lack of prior significant record, that I could even consider 
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probation or retained jurisdiction." (4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.22-24, p.38, Ls.14-16 
(emphasis added).) These statements reveal that the district court felt it had no 
discretion to impose any sentence besides a prison term. 
The Court of Appeals has recently found that such "undue, self-imposed 
restriction[s] upon the district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion" are 
inappropriate and constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 
824-25 (Ct. App. 2008). In that case, as in this one, the district court focused on the 
awful effects of the defendant's actions and articulated its opinion that a permissible, 
more lenient sentence was inappropriate based on the nature of the crime. 15 In so 
holding, the district court in this case essentially created a mandatory minimum prison 
sentence for aggravated battery, despite the fact that the Legislature has not 
established a mandatory minimum sentence for that crime. See I.C. § 18-908 ("An 
aggravated battery is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed 
fifteen (15) years.") 16 Where there is no mandatory minimum, "The court shall deal with 
a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of 
imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and 
15 In Izaguirre, the more lenient sentence was a twenty-five year period of incarceration 
for second-degree murder. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. The district court determined 
that, because of the nature of the crime, twenty-five years was too little time, and so 
imposed a determinate sentence of sixty years. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, 
despite the grievous nature of the crime, the district court's declaration that the 
permitted sentence could never be sufficient was not consistent with the law, as the 
Legislature had set forth a range of sentences permitting lesser sentences for the same 
crime and such sentences had been upheld by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. 
16 The Legislature only requires that the total imposed sentence does not exceed fifteen 
years. I.C. § 18-908. With this language, the Legislature has provided that the district 
courts may consider suspended sentences or periods of retained jurisdiction pursuant to 
1.C. § 19-2601. 
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the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that 
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public .... " I.C. § 19-2521 (1 ). This 
implies that there is actually a presumption against imposing a term of incarceration, 
and yet, the district court determined that no such presumption could possibly exist and 
that it was required to impose a prison sentence for crimes of this nature. 
As such, the district court's assertion that it was unable to consider a sentence 
less than imprisonment because of the nature of the crime is contrary to Idaho law. 
Compare Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. Therefore, the district court's determination in 
this case that the nature of Mr. Brown's actions made it impossible for it to consider any 
option but the penitentiary violates this principle recognized in Izaguirre - that the 
district courts cannot self-impose restrictions on their sentencing discretion. See id. 
at 824-25. Doing so constitutes an abuse of discretion. See id. This Court should 
remedy that abuse. 
C. The District Court Insufficiently Considered Several Mitigating Factors. And. In 
So Doing, Insufficiently Considered The Sentencing Obiectives, And Thus, 
Abused Its Discretio~ And Imposed An Excessive Sentence 
Mr. Brown also asserts that, because the district court failed to sufficiently 
consider the mitigating factors present in his case and so failed to sufficiently consider 
Idaho's recognized sentencing objectives, and thus imposed an excessive sentence. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 ( 1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Brown does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the district court 
should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a 
sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be 
considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This 
is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as 
a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
As such, the Legislature has instructed that the courts are to "deal with a person 
who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character 
and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for 
protection of the public .... " I.C. § 19-2521 ( 1 ). Therefore, the courts must consider 
whether, given the defendant's character, it must depart from the implied presumption 
that probation will be the result, if doing so is necessary to protect the public. See id. In 
addition to the factors provided by the Legislature in I.C. § 19-2521, the Idaho appellate 
courts have identified several similar factors that a court should consider to determine 
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whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., 
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 
209 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on 
other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
( 1982). In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Brown's sentence, and, as a result, the 
sentence does not serve the objectives and is excessive. 
The first of these factors was that Mr. Brown made several sincere expressions 
of his remorse. The most notable of these was the letter of apology he wrote to Mr. Bell 
and his family before his arraignment in district court. (Augmentation - Letter to Victim.) 
That letter demonstrates that, from the outset, Mr. Brown has demonstrated his 
remorse, concerning himself first and foremost with Mr. Bell's condition and recovery. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-14.) Remorse is a factor that has been considered in mitigation 
in several cases. See, e.g., Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55. 
The district court does not mention Mr. Brown's letter or any of his other expressions of 
remorse during its statements at sentencing. ( See generally 4/25/11 Tr., pp.24-43.) In 
fact, it told Mr. Brown that "[y]ou've got a lot of soul-searching to do," implying that he 
had not yet made progress in this regard. (4/25/11 Tr., p.29, L.20.) By not considering 
this factor, the district court insufficiently considered Mr. Brown's character and 
condition, as required by the Legislature. I.C. § 19-2521 ( 1 ). Therefore, it insufficiently 
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considered whether society demanded protection by incarcerating Mr. Brown. As such, 
it failed to sufficiently consider the primary sentencing objective and abused its 
discretion. 
The second factor was the fact that Mr. Brown accepted responsibility for his 
actions. (See, e.g., PSI, p.5; 4/25/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-14, p.19, Ls.2-9.) Demonstrating 
this, Mr. Brown was fully cooperative throughout this case. For example, he was 
fully cooperative with the presentence investigator. (PSI, p.12.) Trial counsel also 
represented to the district court that Mr. Brown gave a full confession to the police. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-7.) In fact, the district court recognized that his desire to take 
responsibility had caused his felony case to proceed at "lightning speed." (Tr., p.27, 
Ls.10-23.) Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant 
are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 
(Ct. App. 2010), rev. denied. Mr. Brown has made these two acknowledgements, 
demonstrating that he has taken these critical first steps. 
However, while the district court acknowledged Mr. Brown's desire to accept 
responsibility, it did not sufficiently consider the impact those acknowledgements had 
on the need to protect society by incarcerating Mr. Brown. See I.C. § 19-2521(1). The 
Court of Appeals has recognized that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not 
force the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has 
decreased the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 
635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). As such, where rehabilitation has reduced the risk of 
recidivism, society's need to protect itself by incarcerating the offender is also reduced. 
Furthermore, Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that rehabilitative opportunities 
need to be timely in order to be effective. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 
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(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 ); 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 
639. However, as the district court noted, prison does not always afford 
effective rehabilitative opportunities. ( 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21.) Therefore, by sending 
Mr. Brown to prison, it cut short, rather than continued the rehabilitation that had begun 
with his acceptance of responsibility. ( See, e.g., Augmentation - Certificates.) As a 
result, it insufficiently considered both the objective to provide the necessary protection 
to society and the objective to afford Mr. Brown rehabilitative opportunities, and in so 
doing, abused its discretion. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
In addition, as defense counsel expressed, Mr. Brown wanted to take 
responsibility because of a desire to "make things right for Jesse [Mr. Bell] and his 
family." (4/25/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.) One way in which Mr. Brown might accomplish 
that is through restitution payments, which had been ordered for medical costs. 
(See generally Augmentation - Restitution Affidavit; Restitution Order, pp.1-2.) The 
district court ordered Mr. Brown to pay $369.95 in restitution for the medical costs 
· Mr. Bell had incurred as of that date, and the order was left open to include costs 
incurred in the future. (Augmentation - Restitution Order, p.2.) The defendant's 
willingness to pay restitution is also a factor that is properly considered in mitigation at 
sentencing. See State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, the 
district court's insufficient consideration of Mr. Brown's desire to make things right for 
Mr. Bell constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
A third insufficiently-considered mitigating factor was Mr. Brown's lack of a 
significant prior record. The need to sufficiently consider this particular factor is so 
important that the Legislature actually instructed the district courts to consider it twice as 
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it determines whether it is necessary to abandon the implied presumption against 
incarceration in order to protect society from a defendant. I.C. § 19-2521 (1) (f), (2)(g). 
As the PSI reports, Mr. Brown's record at the time of sentencing consisted of five non-
violent misdemeanors convictions and one non-violent pending felony charge. (PSI, 
pp.5-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has continually "recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595 (quoting Owen, 73 Idaho at 402). As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Shideler considered the fact that the charged offense was the defendant's first felony to 
be a mitigating factor that, in combination with other mitigating factors, justified a more 
lenient sentence. Id. 
The reason for that is that the person who has only committed their first felony 
does not yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this point is more 
likely. Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Timing, as noted earlier, is an important factor for the 
district court to consider when addressing effective rehabilitation. See id.; Nice, 103 
Idaho at 91; Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. The district court in 
this case actually acknowledged the fact that prison does not provide effective 
rehabilitative opportunities, and so it hesitates to send young offenders who do not 
have significant records (i.e., no fixed character for crime) to prison. (4/25/11 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.5-21.) It even recognized that Mr. Brown is one such offender. (4/25/11 Tr., p.38, 
Ls.14-15, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.3.) And yet, it still sentenced him to a substantial prison 
term, demonstrating its insufficient consideration of Mr. Brown's record and his need for 
timely and effective rehabilitation. As such, the district court abused its discretion. 
The fourth factor was the continuing support that Mr. Brown has, particularly from 
his family. (See 4/25/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-11.) Family constitutes an important part 
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of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 
(holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not 
equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the 
support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of 
consideration). In fact, Mr. Brown's goal is to return the support he has from his family 
and provide it to his girlfriend and her child. (PSI, p.11.) And, in a similar manner, 
Mr. Bell also encouraged Mr. Brown to make something positive of himself, to give back 
to other people. ( See 4/25/11 Tr., p.41, L.23 - p.42, L 1.) While Mr. Bell may not be 
"supportive" of Mr. Brown, his impact statement reveals the need for the district court to 
sufficiently consider rehabilitative opportunities: providing effective rehabilitation 
increases the protection that a sentence ultimately affords society by helping transform 
the offender into a contributing member of that society. Therefore, by not sufficiently 
considering this factor, the district court abused its discretion. 
Finally, the district court insufficiently considered the factors set forth by the 
Legislature to assist in the determination of whether the district court should deviate 
from the implied presumption that a sentence should not include incarceration unless 
society demands that level of protection, given the defendant's character. See 
I. C. § 19-2521. The Legislature identified six factors that indicate a need for 
incarceration and nine factors that indicate incarceration is inappropriate. Id. Of the six 
factors indicating a need for incarceration, two are not served by this sentence. As the 
district court recognized (4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21 ), prison will not effectively serve to 
rehabilitate Mr. Brown. I.C. § 19-2521 (1) (b ). Neither is he a professional criminal (PSI, 
pp.5-6), as he only five prior convictions and one other pending charge, all of which 
were non-violent crimes. I.C. § 19-2521(1) (f). This further demonstrates that there 
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is a lessened need to protect society from Mr. Brown through incarceration. See 
I.C. § 19 2521(1) 
Furthermore, of the nine factors indicating incarceration is inappropriate, five are 
present in Mr. Brown's case. Most notable is the fact that there were substantial 
grounds which tend to excuse his conduct, though not establishing a defense, those 
being the provocation of the threat against Mr. Brown's girlfriend's child allegedly made 
by the intended target I.C. § 19-2521(2)(c)-(d). Related to this is the fact that 
Mr. Brown's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to reoccur - namely the 
dual factors of the threat and his retaliatory decisions. See I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(h). 
Notably, Mr. Brown is unlikely to react in such a manner again, as he now recognizes 
that his best course of action in a similar situation is to go to the authorities. 
(Augmentation - Letter to State.) His character, as evidenced by his remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility, also demonstrates that the commission of another crime is 
unlikely. See I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(i). Finally, he does not have a significant history of 
delinquency. See LC. § 1902521 (2)(g). A sufficient consideration of all these factors 
indicates that Mr. Brown's sentence should not have included incarceration, especially 
when there were other, more appropriate options the district court could have employed. 
(See 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-21 (noting that there are better, more effective rehabilitative 
opportunities available in the community or through the rider programs.)) The district 
court's insufficient consideration of these factors, however, led it to abuse its discretion 
and impose an excessive sentence. 
A sufficient examination of all the mitigating factors present in this case reveals 
that a more lenient sentence, one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other 
objectives - protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 
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124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the 
sentencing objectives). One option the district court had, by its own admission, was to 
retain jurisdiction while Mr. Brown participated in a rider program. (4/27/11 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.8-10.) When a sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a 
sentence. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001) (recognizing a sentence is 
imposed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins); State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 
808, 812-13 (Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing a sentence is executed once the defendant is 
remanded to the custody of the Department of Correction). Therefore, both the 
retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still present. 
See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how even a 
sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the 
court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives), rev. dismissed. Such a 
sentence punishes Mr. Brown by depriving him not only of his liberty during his period of 
retained jurisdiction, but several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm) as 
well, since this is a felony offense. These results, along with the imposed sentence, 
also serve as a deterrent to society at large. See id. Furthermore, it deters Mr. Brown 
specifically because the sentence need not be suspended should he perform poorly or 
otherwise violate the terms of the rider. Even if he completes the rider and is placed on 
probation, the looming sentence still deters him from violating his probation. 
In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society receives equally 
similar protection by retaining jurisdiction as it does by incarcerating him. Mr. Brown is 
in the custody of the Department of Corrections either way. He cannot harm society 
during that period, so society is protected whether he is on a rider or in prison. 
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Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to relinquish jurisdiction and leave 
Mr. Brown incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the sentence if he did not show 
progress. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives were 
properly addressed. What the rider provides that a term sentence does not is the 
opportunity to participate in the more effective rehabilitative programs offered through 
those programs. (See 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.8-21.) And, as the Idaho Supreme Court 
has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See, e.g., Owen, 73 
Idaho at 402. Therefore, a period of retained jurisdiction would increase the overall 
protection afforded society, as well as promote timely and effective rehabilitation. 
The same is true for a period of probation. When a sentencing court suspends a 
sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence. See Crockett, 146 Idaho at 
14-15. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence 
are still present. See id. (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation 
addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction 
affects those objectives). In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of his 
probation officer and the looming sentence, he is also deprived of several of his rights 
since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to revoke 
the probation and execute the original sentence if Mr. Brown does not adhere to the 
terms of his probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing 
objectives properly addressed. What the probationary period provides that a term 
sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing 
Mr. Brown to apply the lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical 
setting and take advantage of the more effective programs available in the community. 
( See 4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.8-21.) 
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As a result of its insufficient consideration of the mitigating factors present in 
this case, the district court insufficiently considered Idaho's recognized sentencing 
objectives and imposed an excessive sentence in an abuse of its discretion. This Court 
should remedy that abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the district court violated Mr. Brown's state and federal constitutional 
rights to be free from self-incrimination, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that tf-1is Court 
vacate his sentence and remand this case for new sentencing before a new judge. 
Otherwise, because the district court abused its discretion and imposed an 
excessive sentence, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded 
to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 27'h day of February, 2012. 
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